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FARE YE WELL:

RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE

The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning, but without understanding.1
A recent case 2 in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has raised a very important question concerning
one of our well established rights-that is, the right to be let alone.
Judge Skelly Wright, acting singly, has decided that a young adult
member of the Jehovah's Witnesses should be given a blood transfusion over her objection-her refusal being based upon her religious
beliefs. 3
The right of an adult to refuse certain types of medical treatment
is a well settled rule. No particular reason is required by the electing
person to refuse this treatment. An adult patient, who is conscious
and mentally competent, has the right to refuse to permit any medi-,
cal or surgical procedure. 4 This is true whether the refusal is founded
upon fear, religious belief, lack of confidence in the contemplated
procedure or mere whim. 5 The patient is the final arbiter as to
whether he will take his chances with the treatment recommended
by the doctor or risk living without it.6
There are areas in which the courts have invaded the right and
perhaps justly so, such as in the case of a sick child. Many cases
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S 438, 479 (1928).
2. Jones v. Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (1963), cert. denied,
84 S.Ct. 1883 (1964).
3. 3 Canadian Bar Journal, 365, 368 (1960).
An official statement from the governing organ of the Jehovah's
Witnesses. The view is stated' as follows: Jehovah's Witnesses are
Christians. -They follow the principles set out in God's Word the Bible
...the fifteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles the V. 28, 29 'For
it seemed good" to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater
burden than these necessary things; that ye abstain from meats offered
to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication;
from which if ye keep yourselves, ye shall do well, Fare ye well!'
There is direct Biblical injunction against consumption of blood: the
manner of taking it into the system is immaterial. Jehovah, the Creator,
who made blood, has reserved it as sacred to himself. The blood is the
life of the creature.
4. Knitzen v.,.Citron, 101 Cal. App.2d. 33, 224 P.2d 808 (1950); Schloendorff
v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
5. Martin'v. Industrial Accident Commission, 147 Cal. App.2d 137, 304
P.2d 828 (1956).
6.

Stetler and Montz, Doctor and Patient and the Law, 133 (1962).
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can be cited in which the court has disregarded the parent's refusal,
regardless of the reason, and has permitted medical treatment of
a child. 7 In these cases the court declares the child to be a ward of
the state and appoints a guardian. The guardian is then ordered to
consent to the prescribed treatment. In some jurisdictions there are
statutes granting the court the authority to order medical treatment once it is determined that the child is "neglected. ' 8
In Prince v. Massachusetts9 the Court set forth the rule:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves, but it
does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances,
to make martyrs of their children before they have reached
the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that
choice for themselves.10
The courts have established another exception where contagious
diseases are involved." The judiciary, exercising its duty to protect
the public health and general welfare, has ordered compulsory medical
12
treatment, and there are no religious exemptions from such orders.
In People v. Pierson1 3 the court stated that the right to practice
religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or
the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.
The respondent in Jones v. Georgetown College, Inc.14 had lost
two-thirds of her blood supply as a result of a ruptured ulcer and
because of the great loss of blood, the doctors believed death to be
imminent if a transfusion was not given immediately. The respondent
and her husband refused to consent, grounding their refusal upon
religious beliefs. Judge Wright ordered the transfusion administered
and attempted to draw an analogy to the case of a sick child by
finding the respondent non compos mentis.1 5 Since the case involved
7. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Dl. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (1952);
Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (1947); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944).
8. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
9. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
10. Id. at 170.
11. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
12. Supra note 8.
13. 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
14. Supra note 2.
15. Judge Wright attempted to communicate with respondent prior to
the signing of the order and tell her what the doctors had said. Respondent's
only response was, "Against my will." Judge Wright said "... (H) er appearance
confirmed the urgency which had been represented to me ... it was obvious that
the woman was not in a mental condition to make a decision." Upon this ex-
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an adult and not a child, Judge Wright was, in the first instance,
faced with the long recognized right of an adult to be free from
invasion of his body against his will and in addition there was the
equally settled principle announced by Thomas Jefferson while drafting a Virginia statute defining religious freedom:
• . . (T) hat to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his
powers into the field of opinion ....
is a dangerous fallacy
which at once destroys all religious liberty, and it is time
enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its
officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts
against peace and good order. 16
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed in Barnette v.
West Virginia State Board of Education,17 the principle enunciated
by the lower court that:
Courts may decide whether the public welfare is jeopardized
by acts done or omitted because of religious belief; but they
have nothing to do with determining the reasonableness of
the belief. That is necessarily a matter of individual conscience. There is hardly a group of religious people to be
found in the world who do not hold to beliefs and regard
practices as important which seem utterly foolish and lacking in reason to others equally wise and religious; and for
the courts to attempt to distinguish between religious beliefs
or practices on the ground that they are reasonable or unreasonable would be for them to embark upon a hopeless
undertaking and one which would inevitably result in the end
of religious liberty. There is not a religious persecution in
history that was not justified in the eyes of those engaging
in it on the ground that it was reasonable and right and that
the persons whose practices were suppressed were guilty of
stubborn folly hurtful to the general welfare. 1 8
In addition, the Virginia Bill of Rights has often been quoted by the
United States Supreme Court as making explicit the principles outlined in the first amendment:
All men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and unchange of words and his sight of respondent, Judge Wright seemed to have based
his determination of incompetency. The record is void of other evidence to support a finding of non compos mentis, p. 13 of Judge Wright's opinion, supra note 2.
16. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, No. A158
September Term 1963, Sup. Ct. N.J. (1963).
17. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
18. 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (S.D.W.Va. 1942).
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restrained by the magistrates, unless under color of religion,
any man disturb the peace and happiness of society.' 9
In the Jones case there was no right of the state in grave danger;
there was no interest of the state involved; there was no jurisdiction
in the courts to deny this liberty to the individual citizen. To hurdle
the barriers erected by the above two principles, which are described
by Justice Brandeis as "the right to be let alone,"' 2 0 Judge Wright
made a factual determination that the respondent was hardly compos
mentis and likened her to a child. Judge Wright's fear that the
respondent's life would be snuffed out and his uncertainty 1as to
2
what the law required caused him to "act on the side of life."
The doctrine that an emergency, in the opinion of the judge, requiring hasty action of some kind as justification for ignoring principles of law is a very dangerous principle. It is corrosive of law and
the orderly administration of justice.
There is another right involved where the doctor-hospital-patient
relationship exists. It is recognized law that such relationship is
purely a contractual one from which either party is entitled to withdraw should he disagree with the modus operandi of the contracting
partner. 2 2 For the first time in history, there, is thrust into this
private contractual relationship the coercive power of the federal
judiciary.
Where a patient wants to withdraw from the contractual relationship and offers to sign. a release absolving the hospital and doctors
from liability in the event of death, such release would have protected
both from civil liability. 2 3 The signing by the spouse would have
been further evidence that the procedure was in accordance with the
wishes and desires of the patient, although possibly not medically
approved.2 4 Once the patient has refused to accept the recommended
treatment, there is no legally recognized duty upon the hospital or
25
the doctor.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Virginia Bill of Rights.
Supra note 1 at 478.
Supra note 2 at 13.
Supra note 6.
1 Hospital Law Manual, Consents, §6 (1959).

24.

Ibid.

25. There are four recognized ways of imposing the duty of care upon
another: (1) by statute, Craig v. State of Maryland, 220 Md. 590,' 155 A.2d
684 (1959); (2) establishing it in certain relationships such as husband-wife,
parent-child, etc., Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 P. 381 (1888); (3) where
one has -ssumed contractual duty to care for another, People v. Montecino, 66
Cal. App.2d 85, 152 P.2d 5 (1944); and (4) where one voluntarily assumes to
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Another exception to the "right to be let alone" rule is the emergency situation where the doctor is unable to obtain the consent of
the patient. 2 6 However, this emergency privilege is limited to those
conditions which present an imminent threat to life or grave danger
or irreparable injury to health. 2 7 Before this exception can be invoked, two facts must be established: (1) It must be shown that the
emergency was of sufficient magnitude to justify acting without consent; and, (2) It must be shown that there was present such an
emergency that under the circumstances there was no time to obtain
8
consent.2
The recommended procedure to hospital administrators and doctors
has been to obtain the consent of the patient prior to administering
any treatment. Where a patient has refused to consent to certain
medical treatment the hospital has two alternatives:
1. It can refuse to admit the patient on the ground that
proper care cannot be rendered because of the patient's refusal to permit procedures and treatments which the hospital
believes may be necessary to the preservation of life. No
legal liability will result from such refusal to admit.
2. The hospital can admit the patient and offer such limited
services and procedures as the patient will permit. If the
patient is already admitted when the refusal to consent
becomes known, the hospital must adopt the second alternative since the hospital owes a greater duty to a patient than
29
to a prospective patient.
In his dissenting opinion in the Jones case, Judge Burger quoted
Justice Cardozo and demonstrated how the court had stepped outside
the law and succumbed to the temptation warned against in The
Nature of the Judicial Process:30
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He
is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant,
roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of
3
goodness. 1
care for another and so secludes the helpless person so as to prevent others
from rendering aid, State v. Noakes, 70 Vt. 247, 40 Atl. 249 (1897).
26. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 62 (1934).
27. Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 AtU. 948 (1912); Luka v. Lowrie,
171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912).
28. Supra note 23 at § 5
29.
30.

Supra note 23 at § 6:1.
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921).

31.

Id. at p. 141.
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In a recent case 3 2 before the Chancery Division of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, respondent, a young woman of twenty-nine
years of age, in her thirty-third week of pregnancy experienced slight
hemorrhaging from the womb, which was diagnosed as placenta
previa. The hospital believed that further hemorrhaging would occur
at the time of birth, and it wished to administer a blood transfusion
which the respondent declined to accept. The hospital had relied on
the decision of Judge Wright in the Jones case. The trial judge
stated:
There was no precedent and no authority for the position
taken by the hospital. In a free nation people have a right
to make up their own minds what they will do, saving those
who are interdicted, insane, or otherwise deprived of their
liberty.

33

The Supreme Court of Illinois reportedly has before it a case
involving a thirty-nine year old female member of the Jehovah's
Witnesses who was suffering from a peptic ulcer. 3 4 The lower court,
contrary to the desires and religious beliefs of the patient, ordered
a conservator appointed and had the conservator consent to transfusions of whole blood. The respondent had become a patient with
the understanding that under no circumstances would she accept a
blood transfusion. The petition also alleged that the patient and her
husband signed a release absolving the hospital and physician from
liability for any illness or death that might result from the refusal
to accept blood. The release and limitation of treatment implied in
the contractual agreement was the only basis upon which the patient
would allow the continuation of treatment.
If the decision of Judge Wright is to be followed, how far would
the rule extend? Would the court be required to decide which argument is best concerning the Roman Catholic pregnant mother who
had been advised that an abortion would be the only treatment to
save her life? 3 5 Should the judge in such case order the mother's
32. Supra note 16.
33. Brief for Appellant, p. 2, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital
v. Anderson, supra note 16.
34. Estate of Brooks, No. 64P-04410, Probate Court, Cook County, Ill.,
June 24, 1964.
35. Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals, The Catholic
Hospital Association of the United States and Canada, § 15, p. 4 (1957).
Direct abortion is never permitted, even when the ultimate
purpose is to save the life of the mother. No condition of pregnancy
constitutes an exception to this prohibition. Every procedure whose sole
immediate effect is the termination of pregnancy before viability is a
direct abortion.
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life saved over her objection and the teachings of her church? Consider also the case of a Christian Scientist who refused medical treatment of any sort. Should the court issue a warrant for his arrest
and then order the required treatment?
It is true that many would consider refusal of the transfusion,
thereby risking death,3 6 an unreasonable decision and quickly
describe this as "idiotic" and "ridiculous". But it must be remembered
that this is a religious belief and as long as the practice of this belief
does not infringe upon the rights of others, we have no right to interfere with the practice of it. The "right to be let alone" philosophy
should be re-emphasized:
The makers of our Constitution. .. sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized man. 3 7
It would be advisable to consider again the thoughts of Justice
Douglas in United States v. Ballard:3 8
The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the
varied and extreme view of religious sects, of the violence of
disagreement among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on which all men would agree. They fashioned a
charter of government which envisaged the widest possible
toleration of conflicting views. Man's relation to his God was
made no concern of the state. He was granted the right to
worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity
of his religious views. The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most
people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a
jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the
same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When
the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden
domain. 39
Louis J. GRiPPo
36. Address by Dr. Alexander Wiener, Society of Hematology convention,
Boston, September 3, 1956:
"The recent death of a Chicago woman due to transfusion of the
wrong type of blood, is repeated about 3,000 times a year in the United
States .... ." There is a great deal of discussion concerning the safety
of blood transfusions within the medical profession. This being true,
then is there any sensible basis for making blood transfusions obligatory
as a matter of law?
37. Supra note 1 at 478.
38. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
39. Id. at 87.

